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A STATE INTERVENTION MODEL IN URBAN REGENERATION: DEVELOPMENT 
AND INTERNAL COHESION 
ABSTRACT
This work  provides an  analysis  and an  optimization  model  of  the  spatial 
impact  for the  externalities  derived  from  the  state  interventions in  terms  of 
urban  regeneration  and  rehabilitation  of  degraded  and  segregated  historic 
areas. From the amount invested and state intervention locations, an impact 
index is put forward. The spatial distribution of these impact indexes in the 
interventions' area of influence will be the basis for the analysis; hence, by 
setting some specific objectives of the decision agent about this distribution 
homogeneity and with the aim of avoiding inner segregation and facilitate the 
development  and  cohesion of  the  neighborhood  as  a whole, we propose  a 
model which will allow us to allocate the budget available among the different 
locations  fixed  a  priori.  By  means  of  a  comparison  between  the  spatial 
distributions of impact indexes obtained in both situations, a measure of the 
intervention process and its impact can be obtained.
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1.INTRODUCTION
The historic centres of some European cities have undergone a gradual degradation 
and segregation process which speeded up in the second half of the last century.  The 
causes of this degradation have been analyzed in depth by several authors, both from 
the urban development standpoint and the economic and social sides, being this last 
one the most incidental and fundamental when planning a series of state interventions 
in a degraded, segregated and marginal area. 2
In Schelling’s dynamic models  (1971a, 1971b and 1978) the individuals preferences 
are set regarding the neighborhood area in which he is going to live,  in such a way that 
he  will  move  to or  remain in a determined area depending  on  the neighborhood 
configuration.   T hus it seems reasonable an individual  will  not  reach  his level  of 
“happiness”  in  a  degraded  area  and as  a  consequence  of  its  neglect a  worse 
deterioration of urban environment will take place,due to both the lack of upkeep and 
the lack of new investments in public goods and facilities. 
Over the last few years local governments in these cities have got under way schemes 
for urban regeneration and rehabilitation of those areas, particularly in the degraded 
urban areas closest to the central districts. This has been done not only to improve the 
urban environment, but also to satisfy the demand for housing in cities in an expansion 
situation, in order to avoid the sprawl effect - uncontrolled growth on the outskirts of 
the city (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003). In most cases these rehabilitation plans envisage 
joint action between the public and private sectors, in order to recover these areas, so 
as to arouse greater residential, commercial, leisure and even tourist interest. Mattos 
(2000) states the main aim of public policies will be, in last instance, to contribute to 
generate an attractive economic environment for private investment.  
The  evaluation  of this  urban regeneration programs is a complex issue  given  that 
several aspects are concerned: urban, cultural, social and economic among others. 
Furthermore, the beneficial effects result in externalities which have an impact on 
both the property and the economic activity in the area. This impact is potentially 
quantifiable particularly insofar as the housing demand is concerned: the increase in 
demand is materialized in more promotions of newly built houses, more rehabilitation 3
work and also in a rise in the market values of property. Paul Lawless (2004) analyzes 
and evaluates the results from the ABI (Area Based Initiative) announced in 1998 “New 
Deal for Communities” in at least five aspects: crime, education, health, worklessness 
and housing.
Optimal location models for state interventions could cover several objectives, even 
multiple objectives; in this case, we will try to study the public investment assignment
among the different interventions, in search of the most homogeneous impact for the 
neighborhood  and  the  set  of  possible  locations  as  a  whole.  Assuming  these 
interventions will generate a series of positive externalities, we will try to look for the 
minimum  variability  situation  in  which  externalities  will  equally  benefit  all  the 
neighborhood  areas,  providing  a  greater  cohesion  and  avoiding  its  internal 
segregation. For this purpose, a model was designed in order to study the effect of the 
public investment assignment among the different locations in a determined area.  A
priority intervention area in the city of Valencia (the neighborhood of Velluters) was 
taken as a reference. 
2.STATE INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR LOCATION: PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
There are a large number of works dealing with the state intervention processes in 
urban  regeneration  and  planning  and  their  effect  on  the  residential  areas  and 
neighborhoods. Thus and as it has been previously commented, Lawless (2004) studies 
the ABIs (Area based initiatives) and remarks three major themes which have proved 
central to the wider urban debate: community engagement, partnership working and 
the complexity of ABIs. Eden, S. and Tunstall, S. (2006) suggest how to address the 4
ecological aspect within research and practical agendas for urban restoration projects. 
Focusing on urban housing policies, Murie and Rowlands (2008) underline the use of 
the planning system to deliver different kinds of affordable housing and the different 
style and density of urban housing development as a result.  Furthermore, Cameron, S. 
(2003) studies the housing redifferentiation and population displacement effects of 
urban regeneration.  
Gentrification and segregation (Schelling 1969, 1971b y 1972) effects have been widely 
studied  by several authors. De  Souza  Briggs  (1997),  Blasius,  Friedrichs and  Galster 
(2007)  and  Joseph,  Chaskin  and  Webber  (2007)  state  how  policy  initiatives 
implemented in order to improve neighborhood environments all arise from the belief 
that neighborhoods have an important and independent effect on the well-being and 
life-chances of individuals. Then and from a socio-economic point of view  two main 
fields  could  be  differentiated  with  regards  to  urban  policy  initiatives in  the 
improvement of neighborhoods: a) Existence and provision of public goods, amenities 
and facilities andb) externalities management (Guellec and Rallen, 1995).
Inside the first group we find works which analyze the number and optimum location 
of public amenities and facilities under the influence of the land market (Sakashita, 
1986, Fujita, 1986and Berliant et al. 2006), which, for example, show how households 
or tenants will maximize its utility when the public amenity which gives a positive 
service is located in the centre of the area. Similarly, if the service rendered is negative 
it will be located in the outskirts. 
With respect  to aspects  which influence  the  property and real  estate,  we should 
distinguish the ones which are intimately linked to location from those which are not. 5
Yamada  (1972) states  there  are  multiple  factors  which  condition  the location  or 
acquisition of a property inside an urban area like: a) accessibility and space, b) leisure 
and entertainment space and offer and c) accessibility and quality of the environment. 
Tiebout model (1956) states individuals decide the location of their residence as a 
place where they can attain a highest level of well-being and security. Royuela et al. 
(2006) established that the concept of “quality of life” associated with  well-being is 
sustained on the basic supposition that the physical, economic and social setting can 
influence individuals’ economic behaviorat the same time as their individual happiness 
and collective well-being. 
Manning  (1986) introduces “the interurban household  quality  of life  equilibrium”
which states there is a part of the population willing to renounce to part of their rent 
in order to have a higher level of services and better environment. Thus, they increase 
their utility by means of spatial externalities, which are supposed to be positives. 
Then and when acquiring a property, all attributes and/or location features like the 
neighborhood  characteristics,  socio-cultural  level,  education,  security,  etc.  mean 
spatial externalities which are inherent to the location of the chosen property.  Krum 
(1960) sets an equilibrium model in which after considering the housing attributes, the 
value would be explained by the neighborhood homogeneity and the existing level of 
services. Lynch  and Rasmussen  (2004)  estimate  the  impact  of  the  neighborhood 
characteristics on the real estate market, and check how the neighborhood effect on 
the property market start to diminish with a distance of 3-4 miles. Richardson (1977) 
introduces the “rent externality”component which reflects the impact of the existing 
amenities and services, as well as the better quality of the environment in the closest 6
areas  to  central  district.    Whereas Ihlanfeldt  (2004) justifies segregation and  the 
existence of “ghettos” due to negative externalities of different nature like: inadequate 
housing keeping, citizen insecurity, racial prejudices, etc. 
There is a lot of literature which deals with spatial and geographical economics and 
studies spatial externalities. In the case of property and real estate, externalities could 
be classified in three main groups:  physical, social and urban desertification (López 
García 1992, González-Páramo and Onrubia, 1992). Physical externalities gather all 
positive and negative aspects which affect the property environment, like the number 
of urban amenities and facilities, the presence of green areas, gardens, parks etc. 
Social externalities gather all positive and negative aspects related to demographic 
characteristics of a determined area like the education level, purchasing power or 
ethnic population. The demographic desertification is an externality linked to the social 
phenomena of “filtering” and “gentrification” (White, 1984), which are likeable to take 
place in the central neighborhoods of the city. 
The  effect  of  externalities  on  the  property  are  reflected  on  the  well-being  or 
discomfort  they have on  the individuals; in our case of study, spatial externalities 
obtained  from  urban  regeneration  state  intervention  processes,  like  a  historical 
building rehabilitation for example, are considered to be positive and to imply an 
increase of the utility of the residents and visitors of the neighborhood. 
To summarize, there is a lot of literature which deals with optimal location of public 
goods, amenities and/or facilities, their effects on property and the externalities they 
arise. As so often,decisions about the location of state interventions in urban areas are 
motivated  by  technical,  urban  or  policy  factors  rather  than  socio-economic 7
foundations, therefore and in general the locations fixed a priori could not be changed, 
whereas budget assignment to each one of the locations could be modified.  
Focusing on externalities, they are not always homogeneous and generate segregation 
and inequality. The purpose of our work is to avoid both segregation and inequality 
with the aim of developing and providing a major inner cohesion in the neighborhood. 
From a measurement point of view, segregation is a way of grouping units, whereas 
inequality is not. Segregation concerns the allocation of primary units with different 
levels of characteristics (persons of different races, households of different incomes, 
etc.) among the subgroups of a larger group while inequality examines the distribution 
of a characteristic of the primary units within a given group, with no regard for the 
membership of those units to subgroups. A common measure is the level of incomes. 
Gini (1921) introduced the GINI coefficient which is a common measure of income 
inequality and which has also been used as a measure of Segregation.   Miles and Song 
(2009)  investigate  whether  the  city  of  Portland,  Oregon,  has been successful  in 
creating neighborhoods at several economic levels and in avoiding the creation or 
maintenance of high-poverty areas.
The aim of this work is to get the increase of utility and positive externalities to be the 
most  homogeneous  for  the  neighborhood  as  a  whole, in  order  to  avoid  the 
maintenance of these high-poverty areas inside an only neighborhood and to obtain a 
more homogeneous development and a better internal cohesion. For this purpose, we 
try to stream the public investment among all the intervention locations inside the 
neighborhood, situation  which  will be  determined  by  the  greater uniformity and, 8
therefore,  by  the  minimum  variability  of  the  impact index  which is  going  to  be 
calculated. 
This impact index will depend on the location and amount of public investment made. 
One  possibility  would  be  to  measure  by  investment  per  surrounding  (circular) 
area/surface of influence, assuming that the public service or improvement generates 
non-saturable assets (e.g. public places), for whose consumption no displacement is 
required and which equally affects all the housings comprised in the zone. Thus and 
taking the rehabilitation of a building front  as a example, it increases the utility of all 
resident and passer-by population of the area, without producing a saturation in its 
use  or  enjoyment,  even  though  this  effect diminish  while moving away  from  the 
intervention location.  It should be taken into account most of the interventions of the 
studied neighborhood were carried out with the aim of improving public spaces and 
monuments without a clear bound or at least explicit in their use or enjoyment. 
Thus, the index calculated basically consists of the assignment of a given attribute over 
the surrounding (circular) area; following a similar approach to the law of Clark (1951), 
based on the assumption that urban density decreases as we move away from the city 
centre, and the spatial density indexes introduced in the works by McDonald and 
McMillen (2000) and McMillen (2004). Derycke (1983) and Bailly (1978) also introduce 
a mathematical model in which population density is related to the distance to the city 
centre. 
It should be taken into account that investments are relatively recent and taking into 
account state  intervention  areas  are  not  isolated, it  could  be  assumed  that 
interventions in adjacent areas could also influence the neighborhood. In this case of 9
study, we will consider that not only for the distance (Lynch and Rasmussen, 2004), but 
also  for  the period of  time  in which  the study  was carried  out,  those  effects are 
considered constants and with no influence on the studied area. 
3.PROPOSED MODEL
Thus and in order to calculate the impact index we will assume a discrete space with 
   possible points of location of interventions in a particular area of the city and  
locations or sub-areas (zones) of influence, as well as an ( ) vector,    -dimensional, 
whose     elements are the economic value of the investment made at the point of 
intervention    . 
This vector   will generate an impact index      at each location or sub-area (zone) of 
influence  ( ): will be used to designate the    -dimensional vector with all the impact 
indexes.  In  principle  we  will  set  as  our  main  target  to  get  the  most  possible 
homogeneous  distribution of  the  positive  effects of  externalities  derived  from  the 
state interventions processes; so we could get the most uniform effect on the utility of 
individuals anda greater cohesion on the neighborhood development, avoiding in this 
way segregation and differentiation in internal sub-areas (zones).   We are considering 
that according to the homogeneity principle and in search of spatial equity, a possible 
way of getting a measure of this territorial equity and comparing different situations 
could  be  carried  out  by  means  of  the study  and  observation  of  the  investment 
assignment among different locations, being able to check the variability of its effect in 
both scenarios (“current situation” and “minimum variability situation”).  10
Thus and assuming the intervention effects are distributed in surrounding (circular) 
areas all around the neighborhood (it is supposed they generate public good/amenities 
non-saturable which require no movement in order to enjoy them), the impact index 




      = 1,…,       ,        =1,…,                    (Ec.1)
where
      =is the value of the impact index of the investment for the location  
     =is the investment value made in the intervention located at   (measured in€)
    
 = is  the sub-area  (zone)  of  influence (measured  in  surface  unit)  of  the 
intervention locatedat  upon the   location, with a radius of   
   =is the distance between location   and location   being   a location where an 
intervention  has  taken  place, with     ≠ 0  ∀   ,  with  the  aim  of  avoiding  null 
distances.
 = constant (3.14159…)
Considering the effects of all the neighborhood improvements in a location   for each 
one of the  locations of the interventions are aggregated and, as we have previously 
commented, the effects of adjacent areas are constant. 
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As we have considered as our main target the impact index vector to  be as much 
homogeneous as possible, in other words, to get its minimum variability, which can be 
measured by the variance of the elements of the vector (          ) whose average 
index is     =
 
 
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Thus, the model enabling us to find the distribution of the budget assigned to the 
interventions  which  provides  the  minimum  variability  to  the  impact  vector  and, 



























Being    the total budget assigned to the intervention and   is a minimum value of 
average impact of the investment; in this case,   corresponds to  the average index 
obtained      with the assignment of the investment in the “current situation” , and it 
could be considered as a measure of the well-being obtained in this situation; it will 
also represent a threshold/line to get in the “minimum variability situation”,   being 
our aim the average impact index obtained in this situation of major uniformity and 
cohesion to be equal or even higher than the “current situation” one. Thus,  for the 
same budget     and with this treshold/line    it could be guaranteed that the average 12
impact of the positive externalities for the neighborhood as a whole in the “minimum 
variability situation” would be, at least, equal to the “current situation”, which in our 
area of study (Velluters) will have a value of 38,284,176.10€ and 126.24€/surface unit  
respectively.
4.CASE OF STUDY. VELLUTERS NEIGHBORHOOD(VALENCIA)
The city of Valencia is the third largest city in Spain with a population of 814,208 
people in 2009 (INE, 2009),). During last years it has undergone a wide expansion, 
development  and  growing  process  which  lead  to  undertake  a  series of  urban 
interventions with the aim of recovering the historically traditional and most degraded 
areas like the Velluters neighborhood. The present Velluters district (also knownas the 
“Barrio del Pilar”) is located in the District 1 of the city of Valencia, known as Ciutat 
Vella.  Its origins are not known very exactly, but this used to be a craftsmen’s quarter 
with a simple urban layout located between the western limits of the Moslem and 
Christian city walls, at present surrounded by the other Ciutat Vella neighborhoods 
(Figure 1).13
Figure 1. Map of the “Velluters/El Pilar” districts
Source: Valencia CIty Council Statistics Office 
In the 19th century the historic events which affected the fabric of the district to a 
greater or lesser extent took place, with it beginning to fall into decay and be largely 
overlooked.  Provoking  its segregation  with  respect  the  rest  of the  Ciutat  Vella 
neighborhoods, it turned to be one of the most underprivileged areas of the historic 
centre with a marginalized and ageing resident population. 
In view of this evident degradation of the historic centre, the city council and the 
regional goverment signed an agreement of joint intervention in order to develop the  
RIVA Plan (Plan de Rehabilitación Integral de Valencia), a plan for the comprehensive
rehabilitation of Valencia, in which the Velluters neighborhood was one of the main 
areas of intervention. The main objectives of the plan were the following ones: 
·To revitalize the historic centre.
·To  keep  the  population  which  inhabits  the  historic  centre  and  to  attract  new 
inhabitants. 
·To improve the quality of life of residents by means of the quality of the services. 
·To create social, cultural and educative services, focused on the most degraded and 
marginal areas of the city. 
Velluters14
·To improve the integration of historic centre in the city on the whole as differences in 
amenities and  facilities  provision are  equilibrated  between  the  historic centre and 
other more recently created areas
·To  give  an  incentive  to  private  initiative  in  order  to  rehabilitate  the  residential 
heritage.  
·To give an incentive to build brand new buildings.
At the present time the general panorama in the neighborhood is different, starting to 
be chosen as a centre for activities both for certain businesses and for public and 
private institutions. The main improvements in the Velluters neighborhood, have taken 
place in the urban sphere.  However, there is a series of indicators which sign a general 
improvement in the quality and environment of the neighborhood like: 
·An increase in the population from 3,861 (1996) to 4,067 (2009), reaching to gather 
the 15.69% of the whole population of Ciutat Vella (District 1) and the  3.18% of the 
whole population of Valencia city in2009.
·The change to service economy and change in theactivity of the neighborhood which 
in  2009  was  comprised  in  a  62.3%  by  commerce  and  services,  in a 29.8%  by 
professionals and artists and in an8% by industrial activities.
·An increase in the brand new buildings of 2,045 since 19th century as well as an 
increase in selling and rent prices. 
The interventions taken on the Velluters district during the 1998-2006 period can be 
split into two main groups:  A first group of measures on service amenities (public use)
and   a  second  group  of  measures  on  property  for  residential  use  (private  use) 
connected with subsidies received by private people for private rehabilitation (See
Table1).15
Table 1. Interventions taken in the Velluters neighborhood
State Interventions  in theVelluters neighborhood
Investments in amenities 
and facilities
( public goods)




           23 interventions 10interventions 33interventions
32,224,763.81€    6,059,412.31€ 38,284,176.10€
N.B.: This table shows the distribution of state interventions in Velluters. There are a total number of 23 
public  interventions  and  10  interventions  on  housing.  All  the  action  was  undertaken  in  the  city  of 
Valencia from 1998 to 2003.
Source: Plan RIVA
To make the space in the district discrete we divided its total surface area into a grid of 
roughly block-sized squares (locations) of 50x50m. This thus divided the west-east axis 
into 9 units and the north-south one into 19, with 171 squares in all, covering the total 
surface area and being able to measure both the investment and the impact index in 
the  centre  of  each  concrete  block-sized  square.  The  33  original locations of  the 
interventions are kept, since this is a decision already passed by municipal authorities. 
Thus,  the vector  ( ) = [  ,…,   ]  has  a  dimension  of  =33 and  the  vector
 ( )(          ) = [   ,…,     ] has a dimension of  =171.
It will be supposed effects inside a concrete block-sized square are homogeneous and, 
therefore, equally affect the whole concrete block-sized square area. With the initial
investment distribution we have obtained a “current” distribution for the impact index
generated, getting  an  average  initial  value.  A  more homogeneous  distribution 
(“minimum variability”) could be obtained, without the result as a whole being worse 16
than the initial one (“current situation”). This result will be measured by the average 
index value which should be higher than the one obtained for the “current situation” 
(126.24€/surface unit).
If we locate the 33 investment on a plane and represent these by means of a map 
symbols (circles) which are proportional to  the corresponding investment, we could 
locate and give them a specific weight as it can be checked in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 
shows the “current situation” and Figure 3 shows the investment distribution for the 
“minimum variability situation”, whose average impact index is of  126.77€/surface 
unit (higher than the 126.24€/surface unit  obtained for the “current situation”) with 
the same budget   and the same locations  .
As regards the distribution of impact vector  ( ) (          ) major differences can 
also be seen (Figure 4). For the “current situation” the highest values of the impact 
indexes are  concentrated in  the  blocks  close  to  the interventions  executed,  with 
considerable differences between the closest squares as opposed to the ones that 
would  have  been  provided  by  the  “minimum  variability  situation”,  where  the 
distribution of the index is quite a lot more uniform.  Lastly, Figure 5 shows the relative 
difference existing between the distribution index for the “current situation” and for 
the  “minimum  variability situation”.  As o ne can see, for  this  minimum variability 
situation, the distribution of the index is quite a lot more homogeneous, favouring the 
zones which are hardly benefited for the current situation. 
This formulation is obviously not the only one possible. The model could be extended 
in  two  directions.  We  can  firstly  incorporate  conditional  restrictions  requiring 
minimum public investments in certain zones or for the impact index in certain zones 17
to reach certain values in order to attain particular objectives set by public authorities 
in the intervention process.
On  the  other  hand,  the  model  could  also  be  extended  in  order  to  obtain  the 
endogenous location of the intervention zones, simply by extending vector   toall the 
squares in the district instead of only 33, though in this case we would have to use a 
different impact index, as some of the    would logically be null.  Endogenous location 
does not nevertheless make much sense for the type of interventions that we have 
analyzed, since the initial situation of the district will be what conditions the location. 
In other types of services (education, health or emergencies) endogenous location 
could make some more sense.Figure 2. Density of the investment: current situation
Source: Authors’ elaboration











































0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 9,00Figure 4. State intervention index. Post-intervention analysis: current situation vs. 
minimum variability situation.
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 5. Variation of the state intervention index between the current situation and 
the minimum variability situation.
Source: Authors’ elaboration
5.CONCLUSIONS 
A model is put forward whose main target is to  get a greater homogeneity for the 
positive effects derived from the  externalities with the aim of getting both a better 
development and an internal cohesion in the neighborhoodas a whole, by means of a 20
redistribution  in  the  assignment  of  public  investments  among  the  intervention 
locations; this target is obviously not the only one possible, even multiple objectives 
could be considered. As we have also summarized at the model estimations some 
constraints  about  the  nature  of  the  intervention  or  their  expected  effects  at 
determined locations could also be introduced.     
The  model allows comparing different situations and,  therefore,  we can conclude 
structures more sensitive to the environment and with greater flexibility are required; 
it could be useful when setting strategies in the field of urban planning.  
The results obtained show that (i) for the same number of locations the structure 
obtained for the investment vector   is very different to the initial one; (ii) exceeding 
the  minimum value  established,  the  distribution  obtained  for  the impact  vector  
(           ) in the “minimum variability situation” proves much more  homogeneous 
and provides a higher average impact index (iii) this more homogenous distribution 
favours the most segregated  and less benefited sub-areas (zones) in the “current 
situation”,  providing  a greater internal  cohesion and  better  development  for  the 
neighborhood as a whole, with the consequent improvement in the level of well-being 
for  the  whole  district  and  thus  of  the  quality  of  life  and  utility  of  individuals, 
presupposing  that  all  the  changes  arising  and  endowments  stemming  from  the 
processes are positive.  O n the other hand, the model can be extended either by 
introducing conditional restrictions or by considering endogenous locations.21
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